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Even before Donald Trump won the US presidential election he left 
an indelible mark on US politics and on views of the US in Britain and 
around the world. his victory means those views will now have to be 
turned into policy towards a president many in Britain feel uneasy about. 
Current attitudes to Trump can be as contradictory and fast changing 
as the president-elect’s own political positions. They can be a mix of 
selective praise and horror. he has in the past been criticised by British 
political leaders from the Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson to the Mayor 
of london Sadiq khan. In early 2016 a petition of over half a million 
signatures led Parliament to debate (and reject) banning Trump from 
entering the Uk. Yet he has also drawn the support of politicians such 
as UkIP leader nigel Farage, and polling showed support amongst the 
British public for his 2015 proposal to ban Muslims from entering the US. 
After the presidential election British ministers were quick to extend an 
olive branch. Johnson himself refused to attend a hastily convened EU 
meeting to discuss Trump’s election. Instead he called on the rest of the 
EU to end its collective ‘whinge-o-rama’. 
Coming to terms with Trump will not be easy. Trump will be the fourth candidate 
and the second this century to win the presidency without winning the popular 
vote. He is also the first to win despite having been repeatedly shown to be a liar, 
tax-avoider, race-baiter, sexual predator, bankrupt, anti-intellectual, and who won 
the backing of the Ku Klux Klan and authoritarian governments such as Russia 
and North Korea. He is far from an average US president-elect. Since his election 
some have taken to hoping that his presidency will not be so bad, that he can 
be controlled both internationally and domestically, that economic and security 
arrangements and the norms that have developed over decades will hold. Yet 
Trump’s election is as a reminder that we should be prepared for the unexpected.
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What then might Trump mean for UK-US relations? We can look at the possible 
implications in five areas:
 ■ First, we need to know the man, his politics and what his outlook on foreign affairs 
might entail. 
 ■ Second, do the similarities in support for Trump with the political trends in Britain 
and Europe such as those that drove Brexit form the basis for cooperation? 
 ■ Third, what could Trump mean for the core - largely defence related - of the UK-US 
relationship that is usually protected from the vagaries of presidential and prime 
ministerial politics? 
 ■ Fourth, where might that leave UK foreign policy, which since 1945 has balanced 
Britain between the USA and Europe? 
 ■ Finally, given the attention often given to prime minister-president relations, what 
might a President Trump mean for Prime Minister May?  
ThE TRUMP DoCTRInE
Contrary to popular belief, Trump does have a coherent worldview. But it is not a 
worldview that many of his counterparts across Europe will particularly like. Trump’s 
rhetoric during the campaign, as well as before, illustrates a foreign policy ideology based 
on 19th century, sovereigntist principles. Trump is not a contemporary version of the 
isolationist Charles Lindbergh or Senator Robert Taft who favoured strict mercantilist and 
isolationist policies. Instead, Trump feels that the US has been used to prop up a liberal 
world order that is not necessary for US prosperity. As we detail below, his approach 
could lead to a policy of ‘offshore balancing’. 
He found electoral support amongst those who have been disenfranchised economically 
via free tree and others who feel that US allies have drained US resources for their 
defence, all the while spending their own budgets on domestic investments. As Trump 
put it in an interview in 1990 “Our ‘allies’ are making billions screwing us”. 
He later questioned the US-Japan Treaty of 1960 asking why if someone attacks Japan, 
the US has to go to Tokyo’s aid, but that if the US is attacked Japan is not compelled 
to assist the US. “Somehow, that doesn’t sound so fair”, Trump said. In 2013 he asked 
when South Korea would start paying for the protection the US provides against North 
Korea: “We have 28,000 soldiers on the line in South Korea between the madman and 
them. We get practically nothing compared to the cost of this.” And of course Trump’s 
campaign rhetoric against Germany and other NATO allies without sufficient defence 
spending is hard to ignore. As Trump put it “pulling back from Europe would save this 
country millions of dollars annually”.
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It is easy for European counterparts to 
despair at the situation. But we should 
recall a German saying ‘Nichts wird so 
heiss gegessen, wie es gekocht wird’ 
(Nothing is eaten as hot as it is cooked). 
Trump used inflammatory rhetoric during 
the campaign to fire up voters angry 
that America is being ‘used’ by its allies. 
But, once the new president takes office, 
it is likely that his aides will point out 
the dangers of undermining the entire 
US alliance structure by stating that 
the US will only defend allies that pay 
their fair share. That said, it is of course 
impossible to predict what Trump will 
do — he is unpredictable, but from what 
we have seen thus far his cabinet and 
close advisers seem to be a mix of anti-
establishment and establishment types.
Trump’s choice of Reince Priebus for 
example is an indication of policies that 
will stick more towards establishment 
lines. Trump was considering some 
mainline candidates for Secretary of  
State, such as Mitt Romney and Bob 
Corker. But instead he chose Rex Tillerson, 
the CEO of Exxon-Mobil who was 
against sanctioning Russian following the 
annexation of Crimea. This move sends 
a worrying message about NATO and 
underlines Trump’s view of diplomacy  
as ‘transactional’. 
Trump’s choice of retired Gen Jim 
Mattis for Secretary of Defence, while 
controversial, is again of an individual 
who has long been involved in traditional, 
establishment policies and will in large 
areas tow a line more of continuity than 
change in US foreign policy. Some of 
these names also appear on the short-
lists for CIA Director and Director of 
National Intelligence. His appointment 
of retired Marine Corps General Michael 
T. Flynn as National Security Advisor is 
also a pick closer to the establishment 
than not. Flynn’s thinking veers between 
neoconservatism, as evident in his 
labelling a fear of all Muslims as ‘rational’, 
and realism, demonstrated in his calls 
for the US to work with Russia and 
Assad over Syria. As much as one might 
disagree with Flynn’s views, they are not a 
drastic departure for traditional thinking 
on US foreign policy. Finally, there is 
the long-noted tendency for presidents 
to revert to a certain US foreign policy 
norm. Whatever the campaign rhetoric, 
when they reach Washington DC they 
face a strangling combination of existing 
commitments, lags in defence spending, 
ingrained institutional habits and ideas, 
and a small, static community of officials 
and decision makers.
It would, however, be wrong to assume 
that continuity in US foreign policy under 
Trump means continuity with President 
Obama’s policies. Rather, there will be 
continuity within the administration along 
the lines of a more nationalist-hawkish 
foreign policy. And there will most likely 
be a recognition that the US public, or 
at least Trump’s voters, are fed up with 
extensive commitments abroad. This 
doesn’t mean they want to see US decline 
or isolationism. Rather, it is likely that 
the administration’s instincts will tend to 
offshore balancing. The US will remain 
globally engaged, but will intervene only 
in cases affecting a narrowly-defined 
national interest and such interventions 
(and policy responses) will be the result 
of strict cost-benefit analysis. This will 
annoy neocons on the right and liberal 
interventionists on the left, but may not 
be an entirely bad development. Much 
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consternation between powers like the 
US, China, and Russia have been over the 
‘rules’ of the international system. Russia 
and China prefer a more sovereignty based 
system akin to the 19th century, whereas 
the last three US administrations have 
sought to rewrite the rules of the system. 
A Trump White House will see the US 
move to policies that coincide better with 
the Sino-Russian world view. For those 
that believe in the rights of individuals this 
would be a big blow, but a win for realists.
 
BRExIT, TRUMP, AnD ThE 
FUTURE oF ThE WEST
Few would have thought in 1945 that 
Germany would one day be seen as the 
beacon of liberal democracy, but that is 
where we find ourselves today. If the US 
pursues a policy of ‘offshore balancing’, 
then the liberal world order will continue 
to fray under pressure from illiberal 
regimes. This is because offshore balancing 
is a strategy whereby a great power uses 
regional allies to check the power of rising 
rivals. This was the US approach during the 
Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s and in the 1930s 
when the US through the Lend-Lease 
Program tried to stave off Nazi aggression 
via Great Britain. In the 1930s of course the 
strategy failed and there is a great danger 
that this time around such a strategy could 
fail again. For the last sixty years successive 
US Administrations have created a defence 
dependency amongst allies, particularly 
in Europe. As such the USA’s liberal allies 
are fundamentally weak and not up to 
the challenge. This world order is not just 
under assault in the US, it is also facing 
criticism and rebuke in Europe as the Brexit 
vote indicated.
The anger and tensions that animated 
Trump and Brexit are to be found 
elsewhere in Europe. These tensions 
surround an often overlooked working 
class and an under pressure middle class 
who have growing frustrations over 
the political and economic status quo. 
Frustrations are directed at globalisation, 
elite politics, austerity, fears about threats 
to identities, and immigration. Britain’s vote 
for Brexit was itself seen as a pointer to 
the growing power of these frustrations. 
The election of Trump has taken it global. 
Trump’s election says to the world that 
illiberal politics in liberal democracies is ok. 
This is a dangerous message and one that 
liberals in Britain, Europe, and America 
must refute at every opportunity.
The danger is as much from inside US 
society as it is from illiberal policies. The 
policies of the Bush Administration, 
from surveillance to interrogation, not to 
mention military intervention and rendition, 
strained US-British and US-European 
relationships. Given Trump’s rhetoric there 
is reason to suspect that there may be a 
return to such illiberal polices. This is also 
not an administration that is going to get 
to grips with the structural changes needed 
to improve US government and foreign 
policy. ‘Drain the swamp’ might have been 
a cry of Trump supporters, but Trump 
couldn’t even bring himself to disclose his 
tax returns. A US government tinged with 
kleptocracy and kakistocracy (government 
by the worst persons) is not going to bring 
about the reforms that fundamentally 
change US politics or foreign policy. 
Here it is worth considering that Trump 
has considered nominating someone such 
as Rudy Giuliani or Chris Christie to the 
post of Attorney-General and ended on 
a choice of Jeff Sessions. These men have 
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shown an inclination towards methods that are incompatible with liberal democracy, 
especially as understood in Europe. If the US were to turn in such a direction the strain 
on Euro-Atlantic relations may fracture the Euro-Atlantic consensus, fatally wounding 
the Atlantic alliance and more generally the idea of an Atlantic Community. German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, for example, laid out very clearly in her ‘congratulatory’ 
remarks to the President-Elect that the cooperation and relationship between Germany 
and the US is on the basis of shared liberal values and that cooperation would depend 
on adherence to those values.
Are we, however, overlooking the similarities in what drove Brexit, Trump and rising 
populism and nationalism across Europe? On both sides of the Atlantic we see 
palpable fears about immigration, growing inequality, perceptions of corruption and 
failing political systems, declining trust in institutions and elites, mounting financial 
and economic crises, and populists willing to seek power from this toxic mix or binary 
referendum votes that bring these issues to the boil. In addressing these common 
problems, will a Trump presidency seek common purpose with Britain and other 
European allies? Trump’s campaign rhetoric pointed instead to a presidency that believes 
in the US turning inwards and at most balancing against rather than engaging with. 
This will be a reversal, or at least an unprecedented test, of the approach shared by both 
the US and Europe since the end of the Cold War of seeing globalisation as a force for 
good that benefited and unified the West. Support for an agenda of freer movement of 
capital, goods, services and people has declined, both at the national and party political 
level. Instead of finding common purpose decision makers on both sides of the Atlantic 
and within Europe may pursue policies that drive themselves further apart. Western 
leadership could fragment, leaving the global institutions it has committed itself to 
preserving since 1945 to stagnate.
 
‘ThE’ SPECIAl RElATIonShIP
British politicians and media have speculated that Britain can expect an exemption from 
Trump’s protectionism in the form of a special UK-US trade deal. Does this point to 
the enduring strength of the UK-US ‘special relationship’? As always when discussing 
the ‘special relationship’ we need to remember that for both sides it is ‘a’ special 
relationship rather than ‘the’ special relationship. Both have other special relationships, 
such as US-Israel and UK-Ireland. For the foreseeable future the most special 
relationships for both are the ones they face the most difficult but important long-term 
questions over: US-China and UK-EU.
Nevertheless, the UK-US relationship is special due to links in three core areas: 
intelligence, Special Forces, and nuclear weapons. Demographics, religion, culture, law, 
politics, economics, and much more also make it ‘special’. But it is these three areas 
that are protected from tensions and arguments elsewhere, for example the vagaries of 
presidential and prime ministerial relations. They form the basis on which the UK and 
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US trust each other in ways they don’t 
with others. This has helped make the 
relationship something of the Lazarus of 
international relations; often declared dead 
due to personal fallings out or disasters 
such as the Iraq War, only to soon come 
back to life.
This core could be tested to the limit by 
dealing with President Trump because of 
the degree of distrust and unease in British 
Government and UK politics at cooperating 
with an erratic president who appears 
willing to do and say anything when it 
comes to torture, bombing, and relations 
with authoritarian states. Granted, both 
Britain and the USA’s record in these 
areas have been marked by a degree of 
hypocrisy. But the extremes to which Trump 
has been prepared to push these areas, at 
least in public, means uncomfortable times 
could lie ahead.
 
Intelligence
In intelligence cooperation, relations are 
already strained by allegations of UK 
complicity in torture, such as through 
water boarding by the USA, and the 
sharing of information acquired from it. 
US use of British facilities, for example 
Diego Garcia, has long caused disquiet 
in UK politics. If Trump’s administration 
decides the best way to combat global 
terrorism is a combination of domestic 
anti-Muslim discrimination, torture and 
escalated military strikes in the Middle East 
then Britain will find itself drawn down 
a path that will raise political tensions in 
UK politics. Transatlantic tensions over 
data sharing could grow if Trump seeks to 
develop a database of any sorts of Muslim 
US citizens or Muslim visitors. Trump’s talk 
of deporting 2–3 million illegal immigrants 
looks an impossible number to achieve 
unless legal alien residents are targeted. 
Cooperation with a government engaged 
in mass-deportation will inevitably raise 
questions in the House of Commons. Just 
as worrying will be Trump’s attitude to 
Russia. During the presidential campaign 
Trump turned a blind eye to clear evidence 
of large-scale Russian cyber attacks on 
government institutions and private 
organisation in the US and other Western 
countries, including Britain. Can Britain 
now count on US intelligence pushing back 
if the President himself seems indifferent? 
Perhaps Trump will change his approach 
once he is president. However, that 
the reliability of the US has been called 
into question in such a core area of the 
relationship should give pause for thought.
 
Special Forces
Cooperation between UK and US special 
forces has become an important part of 
the relationship as Britain’s conventional 
forces have reduced and as the need for 
clandestine operations has increased. 
As with intelligence cooperation, UK-US 
cooperation in this area has benefited 
both sides but also come with dangers 
of complicity in each other’s mistakes or 
misdemeanours. The use of drone strikes to 
target terrorists under President Obama has 
on several occasions put UK-US relations at 
odds due to differing views, both legal and 
political, over the use of the technology. 
Trump’s stated intention to target the 
families of terrorists did not go down well 
in UK politics, raising concerns that Britain 
could find itself caught up in activities or 
benefiting from actions that Britain deems 
illegal and immoral. Britain’s own relations 
with states in the Middle East or Pakistan, 
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the latter a country with whom Britain 
has a large demographic and security 
relationship, could be tested by alignment 
with a Trump presidency that goes beyond 
what the Obama Administration has done.
 
nuclear Weapons
Trump’s attitude to nuclear weapons 
poses several problems both domestically 
and internationally for Britain. 
Domestically, any close alignment with 
the Trump administration risks inflaming 
anti-Americanism that could fuel Scottish 
nationalism. Britain’s nuclear weapons, 
which rely on the US Trident missile 
system, are based in Faslane (the base of 
Britain’s nuclear submarines) and Coulport 
(the storage facility for warheads), 25 
miles west of Glasgow. The Scottish 
Nationalist Party is committed to an 
independent Scotland that is free of 
nuclear weapons (albeit one that will 
remain in NATO). It has been critical of 
UK involvement in wars in Kosovo, Iraq, 
and Libya, as well as opposing Britain’s 
intervention in the Syrian conflict. This 
opposition has sometimes won it support 
in Scottish public opinion. Should Britain 
find itself drawn into a conflict with a 
Trump led USA then this could benefit 
moves for Scottish independence and the 
expulsion of Britain’s nuclear weapons 
from Scotland. This would almost certainly 
end Britain’s nuclear status because there 
is no viable alternative location in Britain 
to base, at short notice, both warheads 
and submarines in close proximity. 
Internationally, Trump’s attitude towards 
nuclear proliferation, as with so much of 
his policies, has been contradictory. He 
has sent mixed messages about states 
such as Japan, Saudi Arabia or South 
Korea acquiring nuclear weapons. Britain 
has long opposed nuclear proliferation.  
As part of efforts to reduce the global 
stock of nuclear warheads Britain’s 
capacity has been reduced towards the 
minimum necessary to maintain the 
Trident system. Nuclear proliferation  
may make the case for retaining Trident 
more compelling, although the key here 
will be whether the Scottish people 
feel this is the case in any second 
independence referendum. 
Uk-US defence relations
Given that security is the core of the 
relationship, it is worth considering what 
Trump’s policies may mean for wider UK-
US defence relations. The most important 
challenge for Whitehall will be to respond 
to Trump’s promise to substantially 
increase US defence spending. That might 
sound a welcome development. However, 
US military forces are growing ever more 
technologically advanced, while lacklustre 
European defence and research and 
development spending mean that at some 
point in the future European NATO forces 
- including those of Britain - may struggle 
to work alongside US military forces as 
efficiently as they might have previously. 
Boosts to US defence spending may only 
increase this disparity. Furthermore, it 
remains unclear whether Trump has any 
substantial ideas for reform of the military 
beyond increased spending. Trump has 
claimed the US is being bankrupted by 
defence commitments around the world, 
yet he seeks large increases in US defence 
spending. Such an increase could deflect 
attention from much needed reforms, 
weakening US defence in the longer-run.
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WAYS FoRWARD FoR ThE Uk
These challenges to the core of the relationship leave the British government with two 
ways forward. First, Britain could remain close to the USA in the hope it can be a candid 
friend, make the relationship work and help smooth what could be a highly unpredictable 
four (possibly eight) years. It is worth recalling that George W. Bush’s election in 2000 
brought with it concerns in Tony Blair’s government of US isolationism. In response Blair 
followed Bill Clinton’s advice to “hug them close”. Blair’s Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, 
put it more bluntly when he advised Sir Christopher Meyer, the British ambassador to, 
“get up the arse of the White House and stay there”. By getting so close - and intimate - 
with Trump’s White House, Britain would be trying to protect the core of the relationship 
in the hope relations ease with the next president.
This approach would reflect a long-standing desire by British decision makers to shape US 
power as a means to the end of enhancing British power. They would also be doing so in 
the hope that Britain - of all the US’ allies - can shape a President Trump in the interests 
of the wider West. Given Trump’s isolationist and protectionist outlook it must be asked 
whether he would care that much about Britain’s efforts. Instead Britain could find itself 
dragged into conflicts from which it has little means to escape, not least in the Middle 
East if Trump tries to drop the Iran Deal and things escalate to the point   
of conflict. 
The British government should also be weary of how such an approach may play with 
future presidents or US domestic opinion. Nearly 53% of US citizens who voted backed 
another candidate. Polling shows that an even larger proportion hold unfavourable views 
of Trump. In getting close to Trump, the British Government could help to establish and 
boost the credibility of a president who lacks the faith of the vast majority of US citizens.
Second, if close relations are not an option then the British government could limit 
relations in the military and intelligence communities. But by backing away from the 
USA, Britain would strike at the core of the relationship in ways never seen before. This 
also risks depriving Britain of access to information and capabilities it and other European 
countries depend on for their security. Given the perilous state of European defence 
capabilities, the British government and others across Europe would be weary of any 
moves that increase the likelihood of US disengagement.
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BETWEEn A TRUMP RoCk 
AnD A BRExIT hARD PlACE
President Trump poses a dilemma for 
Britain’s overall strategic outlook. Britain’s 
vote to leave the EU has highlighted 
a desire by some in Britain to play an 
enhanced global role that would in part 
depend on cooperating with the USA.  
Yet in President Trump Britain finds itself 
stuck between a Trump rock and a Brexit 
hard place. 
Since 1945 Britain has based its foreign 
policy and place in the world on balancing 
relations between the US and Europe. 
With UK-European relations now in 
flux following the Brexit referendum, 
Trump now throws relations with the 
US into question. The process of Brexit 
is already proving an administrative and 
constitutional headache before formal 
UK-EU negotiations have begun, with 
Britain’s strategy and freedom of choice 
increasingly revealed to be limited. Trump’s 
election could mean Britain finds that the 
rest of the EU now seeks close relations 
with it to help counter the potential 
disruption of a Trump presidency. As 
such the EU also finds itself between a 
weakened EU rock that will soon be bereft 
of Britain and a Trump hard place. Europe 
is confronted with the dilemma of having 
contracted out its defence to the US to 
such an extent it has left it reliant on a 
political system and president over which 
it has little control. The degree of control 
Britain has over relations with the USA 
are also in doubt. It is now dependent on 
whether President Trump’s more extreme 
positions of offshore balancing are 
moderated by the US political system and, 
not least, the Republican party itself.
Does this mean Britain needs to find a 
third way? Some may point to relations 
with other English-speaking nations 
such as Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. On their own, however, they are 
inadequate substitutes for the scale of 
existing relations that root Britain firmly 
into a North America-Europe  
transatlantic community.
This all poses multiple quandaries for 
a post-Brexit Britain and those who 
campaigned for Brexit so Britain could 
instead forge new global trading links. 
Trump might have hinted at being open 
to a trade deal with a UK outside the 
EU. That’s a position that contrasts with 
his overall protectionist stance. While he 
might leave an opening for Britain (albeit 
one Britain is not necessarily guaranteed a 
good deal over, given there are no special 
relationships in trade negotiations), an 
approach of offshore balancing mixed 
with protectionism risks much larger 
damage to the wider open global trading 
system that Britain remains a committed 
member of. Britain’s hopes of securing 
global trade deals depends on the rest of 
the world being open to such approaches. 
Granted, difficulties reaching global trade 
agreements ushered in attempts such as 
TTIP and TPP, smaller but still large-scale 
(and therefore incredibly complex and 
sensitive) regional deals intended to shift 
the wider trading system. With Trump 
now threatening them, Britain faces the 
possibility of a global trading system that 
is fragmenting, closed and delivering 
stunted if any growth.
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ThERESA MAY AnD A 
knoWn UnknoWn 
PRESIDEnT
Close relations between presidents and 
prime ministers have often personified UK-
US relations: Roosevelt-Churchill, Kennedy-
Macmillan, Reagan-Thatcher, Blair-Clinton, 
and Blair-Bush. There have also been 
difficult relations, albeit ones that warmed 
up later: Major-Clinton, and more recently 
Obama’s initially distant attitude to Brown 
and Cameron. What then can Theresa May 
expect to find when dealing with President 
Trump? As with any president, there are 
risks and opportunities involved. With 
Trump there are so many unknowns that 
Donald Rumsfeld’s famous albeit verbose 
quote about risk seems apt.
‘There are known knowns; there are things 
we know we know.’ For May this would 
have been a Clinton presidency. Relations 
would have faced some difficult moments. 
Clinton would have been more hawkish 
than some in Britain and Europe expected. 
She would have been chased by long-
standing allegations of corruption. But she 
would have operated within the existing 
parameters of transatlantic relations and 
US foreign policy. With Trump, we have 
some ideas of his worldview as being 
defined by a strict view of sovereignty. 
We know what he has said on the 
campaign trail and previously about various 
international issues. But we also know 
he has repeatedly contradicted himself, 
perhaps often without even realising that 
he was doing so. His administration and its 
prominent figures will offer more ‘known 
knowns’. They will still, however, live in the 
shadow of Trump.
‘We also know there are known 
unknowns; that is to say we know there 
are some things we do not know.’ With 
Trump there are many things that remain 
hidden: his tax affairs, connections to 
Russia, allegations of sexual misbehaviour, 
plans for running his family’s companies 
while he is in the Oval Office, his likely 
working relationship with the US military. 
While we know some of the broad outlines 
of his worldview, some of the unknowns 
of it were once the ‘known knowns’ of 
any incoming US president. We cannot 
now assume the US will remain the leader 
of the free world. We cannot be sure that 
trade deals such as NAFTA, TTIP or TPP will 
survive or be replaced with arrangements 
that address their inadequacies and which 
maintain an open global trading system. 
We don’t know if the US will try to sink the 
Paris agreement on climate change. We 
don’t know if Trump will try to dump the 
deal with Iran. We cannot even be certain 
of the US commitment to NATO. Much like 
Brexit remains an unknown we don’t know 
what Trump presidency will now emerge, 
or whether it will change daily according to 
the President’s mood.
‘There are also unknown unknowns - the 
ones we don’t know we don’t know.’ As 
the most erratic candidate ever elected 
to the presidency in the modern era, the 
biggest unknown for May and other world 
leaders is what Trump might say or do 
next. Trump’s shock victory has led to hope 
that he will be a changed man, that the 
‘office maketh the man’. The international 
community should be weary of such hopes. 
His erratic behaviour and incoherent ideas 
have led many to worry he poses a danger 
to the US republic itself. He boasted 
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about his attempts to stay on script in 
the final few days of the campaign, as 
if this is something we should welcome 
rather than expect from a man who 
will soon command the most powerful 
military force humanity has ever known. 
As discussed, what he will and will not 
be able to get away with will be shaped 
by the checks and balances of the US 
system of government. The Republican 
party’s leadership will also influence him, 
although the world will now watch as the 
Republican party’s internal tensions play 
out with global consequences. We must 
also remember that his support base is 
built on anger at being cheated, but with 
no clear unifying sense of what they have 
been cheated from. As Trump struggles to 
deliver, the more he could turn to stoking 
and manipulating fear that overwhelms 
reason, tolerance and sanity. It’s therefore 
easy to foresee press conferences and 
meetings with President Trump where 
the British prime minister and officials are 
left aghast and struggling to explain to 
themselves, let alone Britain’s parliament, 
media, public and allies, why relations with 
a Trump led US are worth maintaining. 
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Donald Trump’s election poses uncomfortable 
questions for Britain about the future of the 
UK-US ‘Special Relationship’. This Strategic 
Update looks at the core elements of the ‘Special 
Relationship’ that could be under strain and how 
Britain could be left between a Trump Rock and a 
Brexit Hard Place.
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